Ladakh’s Struggle for Autonomy:Why Ladakh Wants Statehood and Sixth Schedule Status

On September 25, 2025 demonstrators demanding statehood for Ladakh and its inclusion under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution (a provision that allows special self-governing councils in tribal-majority areas) stormed the streets.

1. In the heat of the agitation, a BJP office was set ablaze, symbolising deep anger against the ruling party that once promised to safeguard Ladakh’s autonomy.
2. The unrest shocked the nation, not only because of the casualties, but also because it triggered a complete shutdown across Leh, sponsored by the Leh Apex Body (LAB).
   1. The LAB — a coalition of social, religious, and political organisations in Leh — has been spearheading Ladakh’s post-2019 autonomy movement.
3. Amidst this turmoil, the figure of Sonam Wangchuk emerged once again at the forefront.
   1. A globally recognised climate activist, innovator, and Ramon Magsaysay Award winner, Wangchuk has become the symbolic voice of Ladakh’s struggle.
   1. On the very day of the violence, he ended his 15-day hunger strike, appealing emotionally to Ladakhi youth to continue their fight peacefully.

But to truly understand why Ladakhis today are demanding statehood and Sixth Schedule protection. The roots of this struggle go back centuries — from an independent Himalayan kingdom under the Namgyal dynasty, to subjugation under Dogra conquest, to Ladakh’s incorporation into the Indian Union in 1947.

From Namgyal Dynasty to Dogra Rule and Accession to India

1. For centuries, Ladakh was ruled by the Namgyal dynasty (16th–19th centuries).
2. The Namgyal kings presided over a culturally rich and strategically important kingdom located at the crossroads of South Asia, Tibet, and Central Asia.
   1. Ladakh was often described as “Little Tibet” because of its deep Buddhist traditions and its close religious and cultural ties with Tibet.
   1. It was also economically significant: Ladakh sat on trade routes connecting Kashmir, Tibet, Xinjiang (China), and Central Asia. Merchants transported pashmina wool, salt, and other commodities through Ladakh’s passes.
   1. Politically, the kingdom maintained a degree of independence, though it had to navigate pressures from larger neighbours such as Tibet and the Mughal Empire.
3. For Ladakhis, the Namgyal period is remembered as a time when the region had its own rulers, culture, and identity. This memory of past sovereignty is an important thread in modern Ladakh’s demands for self-governance.

Dogra Conquest: Zorawar Singh’s Campaign

1. In 1834, the Dogra general Zorawar Singh, serving under Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu, led a military expedition across the mountains.
2. Zorawar Singh annexed Ladakh, bringing it under Dogra rule.

• Under the Dogras, Ladakh lost its sovereign status and became an administrative district.
• Though the Dogra rulers allowed local monasteries and elites some autonomy in cultural matters, Ladakhis felt politically sidelined.

Colonial Era and Early Awakening: The Glancy Commission (1931)

1. In 1931, Kashmir Valley witnessed unprecedented upheaval when Dogra state forces opened fire on Muslim protesters outside Srinagar Central Jail, killing 22 people.
2. In response, Maharaja Hari Singh appointed a committee under B J Glancy, a British official, to investigate Muslim grievances and recommend reforms.
   1. Known as the Glancy Commission, it became the first institutional attempt to introduce a measure of representation in the princely state.
3. The Commission’s recommendations led to the creation of the Praja Sabha (People’s Assembly) in 1934, with a total of 75 seats. The structure was as follows:

• 33 elected seats, distributed on communal lines: 21 Muslims, 10 Hindus, and 2 Sikhs.
• 30 nominated members, chosen by the Maharaja.
• 12 official members, representing the administration.
• For Ladakh, however, this new political space was almost meaningless. The region was allotted only two nominated seats, without the right to elect its representatives.
• Amidst these reforms, Pandit Sridhar Kaul, a Kashmiri Hindu serving as an Education Officer in Leh, founded the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA).
• The YMBA eventually transformed into the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA), which became Ladakh’s most influential political force for decades.
  • The LBA’s role was twofold: it sought to protect Buddhist cultural and religious interests, and at the same time, it became a voice for Ladakh’s demand for recognition within the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Partition and Accession to India (1947)

1. When India gained independence in 1947, Ladakh’s fate was tied to that of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.
2. Under Maharaja Hari Singh, the state initially tried to remain independent, but after tribal invasions backed by Pakistan, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession to India in October 1947.
3. For Ladakh, this meant:

• It did not emerge as a separate political unit, despite its distinct cultural and geographic identity.
• It remained bound to Jammu and Kashmir, where political power was dominated by leaders from the Kashmir Valley and Jammu plains.
• Ladakhis felt that their voice was lost in the state’s larger political struggles, particularly the contest between Kashmiri Muslim aspirations and Jammu Hindu interests.

Early Struggles: Protests, Boycotts, and the Divide Between Leh and Kargil

1. The 1981 Incident: Demand for Scheduled Tribe Status
2. The first major flashpoint came in 1981, when Ladakhis staged protests demanding Scheduled Tribe (ST) status.
3. ST recognition was crucial, as it provided constitutional safeguards in education, employment, and political representation for tribal communities.
   1. The protests, however, ended in tragedy when police firing killed two Buddhist demonstrators.
4. The episode strengthened the LBA’s resolve to pursue Union Territory (UT) status, which they believed would free Ladakh from political domination by Srinagar and Jammu.

1. 1989: Escalation Under LBA President ThupstanChhewang
2. In 1989, when ThupstanChhewang became president of the LBA. He articulated a more assertive approach to demanding UT status.
3. That same year, a small altercation between a Buddhist youth and four Muslims in Leh spiralled into communal tension.
4. The LBA responded by calling for a boycott of Muslims in Leh.
5. This decision deepened divides between Leh (Buddhist-majority) and Kargil (Muslim-majority), which already had contrasting political aspirations.
6. Leh: Led by the LBA, it demanded separation from Jammu and Kashmir and direct rule from Delhi (UT status).
7. Kargil: Its political and religious leaders preferred to remain aligned with Jammu and Kashmir, fearing that UT status would strengthen Leh’s dominance and marginalise Kargil’s Muslims.
8. The tensions came to a head on August 27, 1989, when police opened fire on Buddhist protesters near Leh’s historic polo ground.

Kargil’s Opposition: The Kargil Action Committee (KAC)

Religious head Ahmad Mohammadi spearheaded the creation of the Kargil Action Committee (KAC), which opposed the idea of Union Territory status.

• The KAC demanded instead that Ladakh be given divisional status within Jammu and Kashmir, on par with the Jammu and Kashmir divisions.
• Their fear was that UT status would empower Buddhist-majority Leh at the expense of Muslim-majority Kargil.

The Kargil Action Committeesucceeded in parliamentary elections, it mobilised support for Mohammad Hassan Commander, who became Ladakh’s first Muslim MP.

The Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council Act (1995)

1. The unrest of the 1980s ,made one thing clear: Ladakh’s grievances could no longer be contained under the status quo.
2. After the 1989 protests, the Centre intervened by initiating tripartite talks involving:
   1. The Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA),
   1. The Government of Jammu and Kashmir, and
   1. The Central Government in Delhi.
3. By the mid-1990s, during the tenure of Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao, the Centre decided to address Ladakh’s demands with a new legislative framework.
4. In 1995, Parliament passed the LAHDC Act, creating two elected bodies — one for Leh and one for Kargil.
5. These councils were designed to give Ladakhis greater control over local governance while keeping the region within Jammu and Kashmir’s overall administrative structure.
   1. Leh embraced the LAHDC immediately and held its first elections that same year.
   1. Kargil, however, deferred participation due to political differences and only established its council in 2003.

What Powers Did the Councils Have?

1. The LAHDCs were granted powers in areas such as:
   1. Development planning and budgeting for the district,
   1. Local taxation (e.g., parking fees, local levies),
   1. Allotment and use of land vested by the Centre,
   1. Management of local services like health, education, and rural development.
2. At the time, this was seen as a major concession. For the first time since Ladakh’s annexation by the Dogras, the region had elected bodies dedicated solely to its governance.

How Were the Councils Limited?

1. Despite initial enthusiasm, many Ladakhis quickly realised that the LAHDCs were not equivalent to the Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) provided under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution.
   1. Sixth Schedule ADCs (found in the Northeast states of Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Tripura) have legislative, judicial, and financial autonomy in matters relating to land, forests, social customs, and village administration.
   1. LAHDCs, by contrast, had administrative and developmental powers only, with limited authority over land or resource management.
   1. Crucially, the councils remained dependent on the Jammu and Kashmir government for finances and final approval of many decisions.
2. As a result, while the LAHDCs gave Ladakhis a platform, they did not provide the deep autonomy that leaders in Leh had long demanded.

Politics Shifts: From Congress Stronghold to BJP’s Entry

1. For much of the post-independence era, Congress remained the dominant political force in Ladakh.
2. Initially, Ladakhis placed their trust in Congress, believing that the party would address their demands for autonomy and development. However, over time, disillusionment grew:
   1. While Leh had persistently demanded Union Territory (UT) status and later greater powers for the LAHDC, these were largely ignored by Congress-led governments in Delhi and Srinagar.
   1. Ladakhis felt that their aspirations were repeatedly overshadowed by the larger Kashmir issue, which consumed most of the political focus.
   1. Even when reforms like the 1995 LAHDC Act were passed, Ladakhis perceived them as half-measures, not equivalent to the protections offered under the Sixth Schedule.
3. This disappointment created space for new political alignments.

The RSS and BJP Find a Foothold in Leh

1. During the 1990s and 2000s, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its affiliates began working more actively in Ladakh.
2. The RSS saw an opportunity: by aligning with the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA) and supporting its cultural and political causes, it could build a base in the strategically important region.
3. This partnership was mutually beneficial:
   1. The LBA gained national backing for its demand of Union Territory status.
   1. The BJP and RSS gained legitimacy in Leh, which had long been resistant to their presence.

Rise of ThupstanChhewang

The shift became most visible with the rise of ThupstanChhewang, a charismatic leader who had been central to the LBA’s struggles since the 1980s.

• In 2014, Chhewang contested the Lok Sabha elections on a BJP ticket.
• He won, becoming the BJP’s first Member of Parliament from Ladakh.

Abrogation of Article 370 and Creation of Ladakh UT

1. On August 5, 2019, the Government of India abrogated Article 370 of the Constitution, which had granted special status to Jammu and Kashmir.
2. Alongside this move, Parliament passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, bifurcating the state into two Union Territories:
   1. Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature)
   1. Ladakh (without a legislature)
3. In Leh, this decision was met with celebrations. For decades, the Buddhist-majority district, led by the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA), had demanded separation from Jammu and Kashmir.
4. With the 2019 reorganisation:
   1. Leh felt that its long struggle for UT status had finally succeeded.
   1. The decision was seen as the culmination of years of protests, negotiations, and alignments with national political forces such as the BJP.

Disillusionment After UT Status

While Jammu and Kashmir retained a legislature, Ladakh was left without one. It meant:

1. Ladakh no longer had MLAs (earlier, it had four representatives in the J&K Assembly).
2. Governance shifted entirely to bureaucrats and the Lieutenant Governor appointed by the Centre.
3. Decision-making felt even more distant than Srinagar had ever been.
4. Another unintended consequence was the dilution of the powers of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils (LAHDCs) in Leh and Kargil.
   1. Before 2019, the councils at least had a significant role in local planning and administration.
   1. After the UT was created, the LAHDCs found themselves sidelined, as bureaucrats directly under the Centre began exercising greater control.
   1. For Ladakhis who had celebrated the 1995 Act as a milestone, this rollback felt like a betrayal.

Economic and Employment Concerns

The reorganisation also created serious economic anxieties:

1. Ladakh was delinked from the J&K recruitment boards, leaving thousands of youth uncertain about job opportunities.
2. Graduate unemployment in Ladakh rose sharply, eventually reaching 26.5% — more than double the national average.
3. Fears grew that outsiders might now be allowed to settle, threatening Ladakh’s fragile ecosystem, limited resources, and cultural identity.

Kargil’s Opposition

Kargilshared religious, cultural and political affinities with Kashmir resented UT status and severing of political and administrative link with erstwhile state of J&K, called the abrogation of 370 undemocratic and mobilised against the decision

The Turning Point

1. Far from granting autonomy, the 2019 reorganisation created a system where Ladakh had no legislature, weakened councils, and rising unemployment.
2. Both Leh and Kargil, despite their historic differences, found themselves disempowered under direct central rule.
3. This realisation sowed the seeds of a unified movement, as leaders and organisations from both districts began to demand not just UT status, but statehood, constitutional safeguards, and Sixth Schedule protections.

Disillusionment and the Rise of Sonam Wangchuk (2019–2024)

1. The years following August 5, 2019 brought Ladakh into a new political phase. While Leh had welcomed the Union Territory status, the absence of a legislature, dilution of LAHDC powers, and mounting unemployment soon turned enthusiasm into anger.
2. By 2020–21, both Leh and Kargil began voicing discontent, though in different tones.
3. Recognising the need for collective pressure, Ladakh’s civil society reorganised:
   1. In Leh, prominent figures such as ThupstanChhewang, CheringDorjey Lakruk, and Rigzin Spalbar formed the Leh Apex Body (LAB).
   1. In Kargil, multiple organisations came together to form the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA).
4. Though Leh and Kargil historically had contrasting aspirations, both now demanded statehood and constitutional safeguards.
5. For the first time in decades, Ladakh saw the possibility of a joint movement across its two districts.
6. Into this shifting landscape stepped Sonam Wangchuk, an engineer, innovator, and climate activist known internationally for his work in education and sustainability.

• Wangchuk was already a household name, celebrated for projects like the Ice Stupa (artificial glaciers) and for having inspired Aamir Khan’s character in the film 3 Idiots.
• In 2018, he was awarded the Ramon Magsaysay Award for reforming education in remote Himalayan regions.
• After 2019, Wangchuk became the moral voice of Ladakh’s demands. He articulated not only the political concerns (statehood, Sixth Schedule protections), but also ecological fears, warning that unchecked industrialisation and mining could devastate Ladakh’s fragile high-altitude ecosystem.
• In 2019, Wangchuk wrote to then Union Tribal Affairs Minister, demanding that Ladakh be included under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.
• But after that, nothing moved forward. Wangchuk later revealed that there was no follow-up dialogue from Delhi, deepening mistrust.
• Frustrated by inaction, Wangchuk launched a 21-day hunger strike in March 2023 in Leh.
• The hunger strike was not just about statehood. Wangchuk highlighted:

• Youth unemployment, which had skyrocketed since Ladakh was cut off from J&K’s recruitment boards.
• Industrial threats, with corporations eyeing Ladakh’s land for mining and energy projects.
• Security concerns, pointing out how local shepherds were losing grazing land near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) due to Chinese activity.

The Pashmina March (2024)

In early March 2024, after talks between the Ministry  of Home Affairs (MHA), LAB, and KDA broke down, Wangchuk and other leaders announced a “Pashmina March” towards the China border.

• The march was meant to highlight the plight of Ladakh’s pashmina goat herders, who were losing land and livelihoods due to industrial projects and border restrictions.
• Authorities, however, imposed Section 144 (ban on unlawful assemblies), and the march was cancelled.

Delhi Chalo Padyatra (September 2024)

By September, Ladakhis escalated their movement with a Delhi Chalo Padyatra. Organised by the Leh Apex Body (LAB), the march carried a four-point agenda:

1. Statehood for Ladakh.
2. Inclusion under the Sixth Schedule.
3. A separate Public Service Commission (LPSC) and recruitment process.
4. Separate Lok Sabha seats for Leh and Kargil districts.

The Sixth Schedule The Sixth Schedule, provided under Article 244 of the Indian Constitution, is a special arrangement for the administration of tribal-majority areas. It was designed by the framers of the Constitution to safeguard the culture, land, and political rights of tribal communities, especially in the Northeast.Key features include:Autonomous District Councils (ADCs): Each council can have up to 30 members (26 elected, 4 nominated by the Governor). They serve a five-year term.Legislative Powers: Councils can make laws on land, forests, water, shifting cultivation, inheritance, marriage and divorce, social customs, and village administration.Judicial Powers: They can set up village courts to decide disputes involving tribal communities.Administrative Powers: They can manage primary schools, dispensaries, markets, roads, and fisheries.Revenue Powers: Councils can levy and collect land revenue and certain local taxes.Currently, the Sixth Schedule applies to 10 ADCs in four Northeastern states:Assam (3),Meghalaya (3),Mizoram (3) and Tripura (1).An exception is the Bodoland Territorial Council in Assam, which has over 40 members and powers to make laws on 39 subjects.

Why Does Ladakh Want the Sixth Schedule?

The demand stems from both demographic realities and political anxieties:

1. Tribal Majority: Over 90–97% of Ladakh’s population belongs to Scheduled Tribes. Historically, when it was part of Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh enjoyed protections under Article 370 and 35A, which restricted outsiders from owning land or accessing jobs. After 2019, these protections disappeared.
2. Cultural and Identity Protection: Ladakh is home to unique Buddhist and Shia Muslim communities with distinct languages, traditions, and religious practices.
   • The Sixth Schedule would provide constitutional safeguards to prevent cultural dilution.
3. Land and Resource Safeguards: Ladakh’s fragile ecosystem is under pressure from proposed mining projects and industrial expansion.
   • Sixth Schedule councils would have authority over land use, forests, and resources, ensuring local consent in such matters.
4. Political Autonomy: Since 2019, Ladakh has had no legislature. Inclusion in the Sixth Schedule would empower local councils with legislative and executive authority, giving Ladakhis a say in their governance.
5. Unemployment Concerns: Graduate unemployment in Ladakh stands at 26.5%, much higher than the national average.
   • Locals fear that without Sixth Schedule protections, jobs could go to outsiders, worsening youth alienation.

Recommendation by the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (2019)

In September 2019, shortly after the abrogation of Article 370, the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (NCST) recommended that Ladakh be brought under the Sixth Schedule. It noted:

1. The region’s overwhelming tribal population,
2. Restrictions on land ownership by outsiders,
3. The need to preserve Ladakh’s distinct cultural heritage.

The Constitutional Hurdle

Despite the strong case, there are serious legal and political challenges:

1. The Sixth Schedule has, until now, been reserved exclusively for the Northeast.
2. Other tribal regions in India (like Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha) are covered by the Fifth Schedule, which provides less autonomy.
3. AMHA admitted: “Ladakh’s inclusion in the Sixth Schedule would be difficult. The Constitution is very clear — the Sixth Schedule is for the Northeast. For tribal areas elsewhere, there is the Fifth Schedule.”

Comparative Analysis: Arguments For vs. Arguments Against Ladakh’s Demands

Supporting Ladakh’s Demands (For Statehood & Sixth Schedule)	Arguments Against (Concerns & Criticism)
Political Autonomy & Representation: • Since 2019, Ladakh is a UT without legislature → no elected lawmakers. • Earlier, it had 4 MLAs in J&K Assembly + 1995 LAHDC Councils (gave partial voice). • Now run by Lieutenant Governor & Delhi-appointed bureaucrats → people feel dispossessed. • Statehood = restore democracy (like J&K UT has). • Sixth Schedule = empower Autonomous District Councils for grassroots democracy.	Security Concerns with Statehood: • Ladakh borders China & Pakistan, making it highly sensitive. • Statehood = full legislative powers may complicate coordination between civil govt. & military. • UT system ensures direct chain of command from Delhi to army. • Critics: Statehood may weaken Delhi’s strategic grip at a fragile frontier.
Protection of Tribal Identity & Culture: • 97% population = Scheduled Tribes (STs) → one of India’s most tribal-dominated regions. • Under Article 370 & 35A, Ladakhis had protection over land, jobs, culture → lost after 2019 abrogation. • Sixth Schedule safeguards: – Languages (Ladakhi, Balti, Tibetan dialects), – Religious traditions (Buddhist, Shia Muslim), – Social customs & heritage.	Legal & Constitutional Hurdles: • Sixth Schedule was designed only for Northeast (Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram). • Other tribal regions (Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh) fall under Fifth Schedule (weaker autonomy). • Extending Sixth Schedule to Ladakh = needs constitutional amendment. • Govt view: “For other tribal areas, there is the Fifth Schedule.”
Preservation of Land & Natural Resources: • Ladakh’s fragile ecosystem: glaciers, deserts, meadows. • Climate activists warn: industrial projects & mining may destroy glaciers. • Wangchuk: bringing “lakhs of outsiders” will overwhelm carrying capacity. • Rivers (Indus, Zanskar, Shyok, Suru) originate here → vital for agriculture downstream.	Risk of Precedent: • If Ladakh gets Sixth Schedule, other tribal regions outside Northeast (Himachal, MP, Gujarat, etc.) may demand same. • Could trigger multiple autonomy claims → strain India’s federal balance.
Addressing the Unemployment Crisis: • Graduate unemployment = 26.5% (double national avg). • After 2019, Ladakh delinked from J&K recruitment boards → job shrinkage. • No Ladakh Public Service Commission (LPSC) → delays + outsider fears. • Statehood + Sixth Schedule can: – Create LPSC, – Ensure domicile-based reservations, – Prioritise local jobs.	Administrative Complexity: • Sixth Schedule creates extra layers (autonomous councils). • Ladakh already struggles with remoteness, low population, harsh climate. • More bureaucracy could slow development, governance & emergency responses.
Economic Development Suited to Local Needs: • Current plans are Delhi-centric, not Ladakh-specific. • With autonomy, Ladakh could: – Build infrastructure for high-altitude life, – Promote renewable energy (solar, wind, hydropower), – Encourage organic farming & horticulture, – Boost tourism (trekking, monasteries, Hanle Dark Sky Reserve). • Ensures inclusive, eco-sensitive growth.	Centre Already Provides Strong Support: • Ladakh gets large central funds for infra & growth. • Recent projects: – Khelo India Winter Games 2025 in Ladakh, – Women entrepreneurship schemes (2025 budget), – Expanding solar & wind power, – New tunnels, roads, 4G expansion. • Critics: Instead of Sixth Schedule, better to strengthen Hill Councils (LAHDCs) with more power.
Security & Strategic Autonomy: • Ladakh = frontline against China & Pakistan. • Galwan clash (2020) showed vulnerability. • Local shepherds lost grazing land near LAC to Chinese patrols. • Locals argue: empowered councils & statehood = community involvement in defending borders → strengthens India’s hold.	Reservation & Representation Reforms (2025): • UT Govt already introduced reforms (2025): – Overall reservation = 85%, – ST reservation = 80%. • Almost all jobs & education now reserved for Ladakhis. • Govt says: locals already enjoy strong protection, so Sixth Schedule less urgent.
Long-Term Survival & Self-Determination: • For Ladakhis, autonomy is about survival of culture, ecology & identity. • Statehood + Sixth Schedule seen as insurance for future generations.	Economic Restrictions of Sixth Schedule: • Sixth Schedule limits industries & mining to protect tribal lands. • Critics warn: this may block investment, jobs & infrastructure. • Govt’s stance: controlled development via Centre is better for growth than restrictive autonomy.

Possible Solutions and the Way Forward

1. Expand Powers of Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils (LAHDCs)

• The 1995 LAHDC Act was once celebrated as a breakthrough, but post-2019, the councils have been sidelined.
• A practical step forward would be to strengthen LAHDCs in Leh and Kargil by giving them:
  • Greater control over land use and natural resources,
  • Authority over local taxation and revenue generation,
  • Powers in education, healthcare, and cultural preservation,
  • Decision-making rights in employment and recruitment.
• This would not require a constitutional amendment and could be achieved through executive orders or parliamentary amendments.

2. Special Legislative Status with Limited Autonomy

• Another option is to create a dedicated Act of Parliament under Article 240, granting Ladakh a special legislature with powers over local matters.
• The Centre would retain authority over defence, foreign affairs, and high-level security, but Ladakhis would regain their say in day-to-day governance.
• This hybrid approach balances local democracy with strategic central oversight.

3. A Tailored Sixth Schedule Model for Ladakh

• Instead of importing the Northeast’s model wholesale, India could design a modified Sixth Schedule framework for Ladakh.
• A joint committee of Leh Apex Body (LAB), Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA), and central authorities could draft a customised version, tailored to:
  • Ladakh’s tribal majority population,
  • Its strategic border location,
  • Its fragile ecosystem and limited resources.
• This would ensure autonomy with accountability, while preventing misuse of powers.

4. Enhanced Financial Devolution and Development Grants

• Ladakh requires massive investment in infrastructure, education, healthcare, and renewable energy.
• The Centre could increase direct financial transfers and grants to the region, ensuring that:
  • Funds are managed locally,
  • Development is eco-sensitive and community-driven,
  • Projects are linked to job creation for Ladakhis.
• International climate finance mechanisms, like the Green Climate Fund, could also be tapped to support renewable energy and glacier protection projects.

5. Creation of a Ladakh Public Service Commission (LPSC)

• Establishing a Ladakh Public Service Commission (LPSC) would ensure:
  • Domicile-based job reservations,
  • Fair recruitment processes,
  • Greater trust among Ladakhi youth, who currently face 26.5% graduate unemployment.

6. Institutionalised Dialogue and Conflict Resolution Platforms

• To avoid recurring cycles of protest and violence, there needs to be a permanent consultation mechanism involving:
  • The Leh Apex Body (LAB),
  • The Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA),
  • The Union Home Ministry,
  • Security agencies.
• Such a forum could meet regularly to address grievances, coordinate development, and ensure that local voices are heard in Delhi.
• Lessons can be drawn from Northeast India’s autonomy councils, where structured dialogues have helped reduce conflict.

7. Judicial Fairness and Responsible Use of Security Laws

• The 2025 unrest saw Sonam Wangchuk accused of inciting protests and reportedly detained under the National Security Act (NSA).
• Heavy-handed use of such laws risks alienating the population further.
• The government must ensure transparent judicial processes and avoid overusing draconian measures that could escalate tensions.

8. Protecting Cultural Heritage and Environmental Sustainability

• Beyond politics, Ladakhis fear the erosion of culture and the destruction of their ecology.
• Solutions could include:
  • Legal safeguards for Ladakhi languages, monasteries, and cultural sites,
  • Strict environmental regulations to prevent unsustainable mining and industrialisation.